Είκοσι χρόνια xωρίς τον Παύλο Μπακογιάννη

ΑΘΩΟΣ ΒΟΥΡΛΟΥΜΗΣ - ΙΩΑΝΝΙΔΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΤΕ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ INTRACOM

Απαλλάχθηκε οριστικά από το Συμβούλιο Εφετών, ο πρώην πρόεδρος και διευθύνοντας σύμβουλος του ΟΤΕ, Παναγή Βουρλούμη, από την κατηγορία της απιστίας σε βαθμό κακουργήματος.
Ο πρώην πρόεδρος και διευθύνοντας σύμβουλος του ΟΤΕ Παναγής Βουρλούμης, απαλάχθηκε μαζί με τον Γιώργο Ιωαννίδη, διευθυντή τεχνικών υπηρεσιών, ανατρέποντας, ένα χρόνο μετά, το βούλευμα του Πρωτοδικείου το οποίο έκρινε πως τα δυο πρώην ανώτερα στελέχη έπρεπε να καθίσουν στο εδώλιο για υπόθεση υπερτιμολογήσεων σε συμβάσεις που υπέγραψε ο ΟΤΕ για υπηρεσίες τεχνικής υποστήριξης των δικτύων του, ενόψει των Ολυμπιακών Αγώνων που αφορούσαν την περίοδο 2003 -2007 με εταιρείες, μεταξύ των οποίων η INTRACOM και η SIEMENS.



Σύμφωνα με τους εφέτες δεν υπάρχουν επαρκείς ενδείξεις για να παραπεμφθούν σε δίκη οι κατηγορούμενοι και τους απάλλαξαν οριστικά.


Η επίμαχη συμφωνία του ΟΤΕ είχε τίμημα 130 εκατομμύρια ευρώ, ποσό που η Διεύθυνση Διαχείρισης Δικτύου και Συντήρησης (ΔΔΔΚΣ) του Οργανισμού είχε κοστολογήσει στο ήμισυ, ενώ το πρωτόδικο βούλευμα θεωρούσε πως το τίμημα στις συμβάσεις αυτές ήταν κατά πολύ μεγαλύτερο από αυτό που είχε εκτιμήσει και προϋπολογίσει η αρμόδια Διεύθυνση Διαχείρισης και Συντήρησης Δικτύων του ΟΤΕ και έτσι διαπίστωνε την διάπραξη αδικήματος.
http://prezatv.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_1244.html#more

"ΜΠΑΜΠΑ ΓΙΑΤΙ ΜΕ ΧΤΥΠΗΣΕ;"

Ρεπορτάζ : Αλέξανδρος Κυριακόπουλος
(από την Ελευθεροτυπία)
«Μπαμπά, γιατί με χτύπησε ο κύριος;» αναρωτήθηκε, σοκαρισμένη ακόμα, η οκτάχρονη Μελίνα. «Δεν καταλαβαίνω γιατί». Λίγο μετά το χτύπημα της μικρής από τις δυνάμεις των ΜΑΤ, ο φωτογραφικός φακός απαθανάτισε τον παιδικό τρόμο και η...
φωτογραφία της, γαντζωμένη στην αγκαλιά του πατέρα της, δημοσιεύθηκε στο χθεσινό πρωτοσέλιδο της «Ε» προκαλώντας αίσθηση.

Το όνομά της Μελίνα. Πρόκειται για την οκτάχρονη που χτυπήθηκε την Κυριακή από δυνάμεις των ΜΑΤ, ενώ η φωτογραφία της, στο χθεσινό πρωτοσέλιδο της «Ε» γαντζωμένη στην αγκαλιά του πατέρα της, προκάλεσε πληθώρα αντιδράσεων και πολλές αναδημοσιεύσεις στο Διαδίκτυο
Στις εύλογες απορίες της κόρης του, ο μπαμπάς της προσπάθησε να εξηγήσει τα... ανεξήγητα. Σίγουρα, ένας κύριος δεν χτυπάει ποτέ, τουλάχιστον ένα μικρό παιδί. Στη συνέχεια, πως «ήρθαμε εδώ για να διαμαρτυρηθούμε για κάποιες αποφάσεις που παίρνουν εκεί μέσα (σ.σ. Βουλή) και που κάθε μέρα μειώνουν τα λεφτά που παίρνει ο μπαμπάς και η μαμά». Και ενώ η ειρηνική διαμαρτυρία τους στο Σύνταγμα την περασμένη Κυριακή δεν είχε καν αρχίσει, οι «κύριοι» με τα πράσινα τους επιτέθηκαν αναίτια, ενώ ένας από αυτούς, με την ασπίδα που πάνω γράφει «Αστυνομία/Police», χτύπησε τη μικρή Μελίνα δυνατά στο πρόσωπο.

Ο πατέρας της, ο Ηλίας Βρεττάκος, μπορεί να είναι αντιπρόεδρος της ΑΔΕΔΥ, όμως στο Σύνταγμα την Κυριακή βρέθηκε χωρίς τη συνδικαλιστική του ιδιότητα. «Ηρθαμε οικογενειακά». Αφορμή για την αναίτια επίθεση που δέχτηκαν ήταν «απλά ότι βρισκόμασταν εκεί», όπως καταγγέλλουν και τα μέλη του κινήματος «Δεν Πληρώνω» που διοργάνωναν τη συγκέντρωση διαμαρτυρίας.

«Τα ΜΑΤ θέλανε να φύγουμε από το πεζοδρόμιο» συνεχίζει ο κ. Βρεττάκος. «Να μας διώξουν. Ετρεξαν κατά πάνω μας. Μας φώναζαν, έβριζαν και με τις ασπίδες τους άρχισαν να μας σπρώχνουν βίαια. Χτύπησαν την κόρη μου με την ασπίδα στη γνάθο. Αυτή άρχισε να κλαίει. Την πήρα στην αγκαλιά μου και προσπάθησα να φύγω. Ετρεμε ολόκληρη. Με έσφιγγε δυνατά και δεν με άφηνε. Εγώ ήμουν εξοργισμένος και η κόρη μου φοβισμένη». Λίγο αργότερα, μόλις η μικρή ηρέμησε, την είδε ένας φίλος γιατρός που βρισκόταν εκεί και τον καθησύχασε.

«Γιατί τέτοια βαναυσότητα σήμερα στο μικρό παιδί μου; Γιατί τέτοια βαναυσότητα απέναντι σε τόσο κόσμο»; αναρωτιέται ο Ηλίας Βρεττάκος, προσπαθώντας τώρα ο ίδιος να εξηγήσει τα ανεξήγητα. «Θέλουν να μας τρομοκρατήσουν. Να μη διαμαρτύρεται κανείς. Να υποταχθούν όλοι. Γι' αυτό γίνεται τέτοια προσπάθεια άγριας καταστολής». Στην κόρη του βέβαια, που τον ρώτησε λίγο μετά το χτύπημα που δέχτηκε από τις δυνάμεις καταστολής, «μπαμπά, τι θα γίνει άμα χτυπήσουν όλα τα παιδάκια;» προσπαθεί να βρει απαντήσεις ανάλογες της ηλικίας της. Προσπαθεί να της εξηγήσει πως οι άνθρωποι στη συγκεκριμένη συγκυρία βγάζουν το χειρότερό τους εαυτό.

«Εμείς δώσαμε αγώνες για να βελτιωθεί η ζωή μας. Στην κόρη μου κάθε βράδυ διηγούμαι αυτές τις ιστορίες. Για τους κοινωνικούς αγώνες, τα δικαιώματα που κατακτήθηκαν και πως η Βουλή είναι ο ναός της Δημοκρατίας. Τώρα όμως έχουν έρθει τα πάνω κάτω. Ο κόσμος της έχει γυρίσει ανάποδα παρ' όλο που δεν είναι σε ηλικία να έχει συνείδηση των πραγμάτων. Είναι λες και ζούμε στις μαύρες εποχές της χούντας. Να σε τσαλαπατάνε όπως τσαλαπατάνε την ελευθερία σου και τη δημοκρατία».
http://fimotro.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_8633.html

''Βρισκόμαστε υπό γερμανική κατοχή.Μας έχουν για μπανανία'' – Καταγγελίες ΣΟΚ από μέλος της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ που ''ξηλώθηκε'' από τον Βενιζέλο

''Μας ήρθε έτοιμο-μαγειρεμένο από τους Γερμανούς το έλλειμμα του 2009''
- ''Δεν υπήρχε θέμα χρεοκοπίας.Το μεθόδευσαν για να μπούμε στο Μνημόνιο και να πάρουν όλα τα μέτρα που φορτώθηκε άδικα ο ελληνικός λαός''
- ''Ο Παπακωσταντίνου μας παραπλάνησε.Μου είπε μη μιλάς εδώ δεν είναι Σύγκλητος''
- ''Τρύπια η Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή.Πάνω από ένα χρόνο έχουμε να συνεδριάσουμε.Μας προσέλαβαν όλους γιατί είμαστε ΠΑΣΟΚ''


Καταγγελίες που σοκάρουν, και αν ισχύουν τινάσσουν τα πάντα στον αέρα, από το στόμα της Ζωής Γεωργαντά, που ανήκει στα 5 μέλη της Ελληνικής Στατιστικής Αρχής τα οποία εξαναγκάστηκαν σε παραίτηση από τον Ε.Βενιζέλο.
Ο υπουργός Οικονομικών ξήλωσε όλα τα μέση της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ εκτός από τον πρόεδρο, τον οποίο η Ζωή Γεωργαντά καταγγέλει για ''φίμωση'' της αρχής.

Το πρώτο μεγάλο ερώτημα είναι τα κίνητρα των σοκαριστικών αυτών καταγγελιών, δηλαδή έπρεπε να εκδιωχθεί η κυρία Γεωργαντά για να αποκαλύψει , μιλώντας σε όλους τους ραδιοφωνικούς σταθμούς, ότι ουσιαστικά μεθοδεύτηκε υπαγωγή μας στο Μνημόνιο και η εξόντωση μας με μέτρα λιτότητας. Η ίδια ισχυρίζεται πως έχει ενημερώσει με επιστολή της προσωπικά τον πρωθυπουργό αλλά και τη Βουλή, στην οποία υπάγεται η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ.

Προσέξτε τώρα τι καταγγέλει η κυρία Γεωργαντά.

- Δεν υπάρχει καμία Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή.
- Δεν συνεδρίασε ποτέ για την έκδοση στοιχείων, τα οποία έρχονταν έτοιμα-μαγειρεμένα.
- Αποκορύφωμα όλων ήταν το έλλειμμα του 2009 που σε μία νύχτα γιγαντώθηκε από τους Γερμανούς της Eurostat, με την ανοχή του τότε υπουργού Γ.Παπακωσταντίνου.
- Αποτέλεσμα ήταν να ξεκινήσουν τα σενάρια περί ενδεχόμενης ελληνικής χρεοκοπίας και έτσι μπήκαμε στο Μνημόνιο, και έτσι ''πέρασαν'' και ''περνάνε'' τα άδικα μέτρα λιτότητας κατά του ελληνικού λαού
- Καμία ανεξαρτησία, μία σφραγίδα και μόνο η Στατιστική Αρχή.Εδώ και ένα χρόνο δεν έχουμε συνεδριάσει
- Για τα μάτια η περίφημη διαδικασία opengov.Μας επέλεξαν όλους επειδή είμαστε ΠΑΣΟΚ

Διαβάστε πως, πάντα κατά την κυρία Γεωργαντά, φούσκωσαν σε μιά νύχτα το έλλειμμα του 2009

"Το έλλειμμα για το 2009 έβγαινε γύρω στο 12%, ασκήθηκαν πιέσεις από την ευρωπαϊκή στατιστική υπηρεσία και τον πρόεδρό της κ. Βάλντερ Ραντερμάχερ, ο οποίος ήθελε να μπουν μέσα στο έλλειμμα και οι δαπάνες των δημοσίων επιχειρήσεων και των ΔΕΚΟ".
"Για την αύξηση του ελλείμματος του 2009 στο 15,4% ελήφθησαν υπ' όψιν μόνο οι δαπάνες των ΔΕΚΟ"
''Εν μία νυκτί η Eurostat αποφάσισε ότι ορισμένες ΔΕΚΟ πρέπει να ενταχθούν στο έλλειμμα''.
"Βρισκόμαστε υπό γερμανική κατοχή"
"Ο κ. Ραντερμάχερ, της Eurostat δεν ενδιαφέρεται για τα στατιστικά στοιχεία της Ελλάδας, μας έχουν για μπανανία, ακόμη δεν μπορούμε να γνωρίζουμε το πραγματικό έλλειμμα του 2009''

http://www.newsit.gr/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=96208&catid=13

Γάλλοι εφοριακοί και τελωνειακοί έρχονται στην Ελλάδα

έχουμε τοποτηρητές το ξέρουμε, ότι ανά υπηρεσία μπαίνουν ξένοι σύμβουλοι είναι επίσης γνωστό, τώρα και από τα πιο επίσημα χείλη μαθαίνουν, όχι τυχαία μερικές ώρες μετά την περιβόητη τηλεδιάσκεψη ότι η ... γαλλική βοήθεια ξεκινάει από τα τελωνεία και τις εφορίες.

Η Γαλλίδα υπουργός Προϋπολογισμού Βαλερί Πεκρές αφού μα ανακοίνωσε τα... γνωστά ότι μας στηρίζει συνέχισε λέγοντας:
“Γάλλοι φοροτεχνικοί και τελωνειακοί θα βοηθήσουν στη συγκρότηση μιας αξιόπιστης φορολογικής αρχής” διότι πλέον δεν το λένε μόνο οι Ευρωπαίοι το έχουμε ζήσει “στο πετσί μας” δεν λειτουργεί σχεδόν τίποτε σε επίπεδο πάταξης της φοροδιαφυγής και έτσι πάντα “την πληρώνουν” οι “συνήθεις ύποπτοι”.
Κατά τα λοιπά, και πάλι εκ Γαλλία μαθαίνουμε ότι αναμένονται “ιδιαίτερα σκληρά μέτρα περιορισμού των δαπανών” τα οποία ο Πρωθυπουργός δεσμεύτηκε να πάρει.

http://www.newsit.gr/default.php?pname=Article&art_id=96003&catid=13

LONDON CALLING

ΑΝΑΦΟΡΑ ΧΡΥΣΟΧΟΙΔΗ ΣΕ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΗ ΠΡΕΣΒΕΙΑ

ΕΤΣΙ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΞΕΧΝΙΟΜΑΣΤΕ ΤΟ ΠΟΙΟΣ ΔΟΥΛΕΥΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΠΟΙΟΝ!!!
Ambassador's Meeting with Minister of Citizens' Protection Chrysochoidis


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001643


SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/19
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SOCI, PTER, KCRM, KTIP, SMIG, GR
SUBJECT: Ambassador's Meeting with Minister of Citizens' Protection
Chrysochoidis


REF: ATHENS 1593


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek Minister of Citizens' Protection Michalis
Chrysochoidis provided Ambassador Speckhard with an outline on
November 12 of his ambitious plan to reorganize and energize all of
Greece's civilian security agencies, including the national police,
the domestic intelligence service, the Coast Guard, and the
firefighters. Chrysochoidis decried the "collapse" of the security
securities under the previous New Democracy (ND) government, which
left Greece unable to confront the twin challenges of domestic
terrorism and organized crime. For this reason, Chrysochoidis has
brought all civilian security agencies into his newly created
ministry; made personnel changes in the leadership of the police,
domestic intelligence, and the firefighting service; narrowed the
mission of the Coast Guard to almost solely maritime border
security; changed the heads of the police's CT unit and its
departments; created an interagency mechanism to foster
collaboration; and proposed creating a new 100-person agency to
fight organized crime as a mini-FBI. Chrysochoidis welcomed U.S.
assistance in his reorganization, particularly training. A
follow-on meeting the next day between DCM McCarthy and Deputy
Minister Vougias revealed that Vougias will focus primarily on
migration and road safety issues. The DCM also explained a variety
of ways in which Greece and the United States could cooperate on
the range of law enforcement issues, and urged Vougias to place
officers in posts where their U.S.-provided training could be put
to good use. END SUMMARY.






2. (C) The Ambassador began the 50-minute meeting by expressing
the Embassy's full support for the Ministry of Citizens'
Protection's (MCP) work on counterterrorism, organized crime, drug
trafficking, and human smuggling. He asked Chrysochoidis for his
best assessment of the new domestic terrorist and anarchist groups
that were active in Greece, specifically the nature of any
connections between them. Chrysochoidis replied that Greece is the
only European country to be confronted with second-generation
domestic terrorism. Similar phenomena in Western Europe, such as
the Baader-Meinhof group and the Red Brigades, burned themselves
out in the 1970s and 1980s. While there was a brief resurgence of
domestic terrorism in Italy in the 1990s, that movement, too, was
undone by good law-enforcement work and internal tensions. In
Greece, however, there has been continuity in domestic terrorism
since the mid-1970s, and the current terrorist groups, while not
immediately linked to such predecessors as 17 November and ELA,
nevertheless are very much the heirs to their activities.






3. (S) Chrysochoidis said that while one can speak of domestic
terrorism writ large, it was important to distinguish between the
three most prominent groups:






-- The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (SFP) has many
people but produces relatively low-level activity. It is more a
movement than a real organization. It deserves attention chiefly
because it is a source for recruitment into other organizations.
It may well have been directly inspired by convicted bomber Nikolas
Maziotis, since the language and ideology of his written court
defense in 2000 are almost identical with the wording, views, and
spirit of the most recent published proclamations by SFP.


-- Revolutionary Struggle (EA) and Sect of Revolutionaries (SE)
originally were one organization but split over internal tensions.
Of the two, SE is the more violent, since it is composed of
"assassins without ideology" who "hate society." By contrast, EA
has an ideological basis. Chrysochoidis said that it was his
suspicion that EA had connections to the Middle East, since some of
its members -- the intellectuals of EA, not the operators -- have
been observed to frequent the Iranian Embassy in Athens and to
travel extensively to such countries as Iran and Lebanon. Some may


ATHENS 00001643 002 OF 004




have ties to Hamas. EA seeks publicity and so engages in visible
attacks that will make headlines in the media. In this regard,
EA's attack against the American Embassy in 2007 was illustrative.






4. (C) Greece currently is not positioned to combat this threat,
according to Chrysochoidis. When PASOK was in power in the late
1990s and early 2000s, it made great strides in creating a modern
security apparatus. In fact, by the time of the Olympic Games in
2004 Greece had succeeded in forming a counterterrorist model of
interagency cooperation that was the prototype for the rest of
Europe. However, the New Democracy government that came to power
in 2004 created "a new reality" in Greece's security services,
which subsequently collapsed. Chrysochoidis said that he was
particularly worried about the collapse in the capabilities of the
police force. In his opinion, organized crime is the "main enemy
of social cohesion." It has infiltrated the official economy, as
well as stepping up its traditional activities in weapons
smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, and counterfeiting.
In addition, authorities increasingly are seeing a link between
organized crime and domestic terrorists. Finally, both
issues-counterterrorism and organized crime-cannot be detached from
their regional context. "Greece has bad neighbors," Chrysochoidis
stated. Albania is a major source of organized crime, as evidenced
by the arrest recently of an Albanian trafficker in women who had a
bank account containing 5 million euros and 5 ships worth a total
of 45 million euros. The problem of illegal immigration cannot be
solved without the assistance of Albania and especially Turkey, he
said.






5. (C) For this reason, Chrysochoidis has decided to reorganize
and reenergize Greece's entire non-military security system with
the following goals:


-- First, he has brought together into the new MCP all elements of
domestic security, including the police, EYP, the firefighters, and
the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG). Chrysochoidis acknowledged that he
was radically changing the nature of the Coast Guard, sending all
of its functions but maritime border security to the Ministry of
the Economy, Competitiveness, and Merchant Marine. The new agency
will have about 7,000 officers and--under a draft law to be
introduced in about three months-a new name reflecting its core
mission. (NOTE: What is conventionally called the Hellenic Coast
Guard [HCG] in English is actually called in Greek the Harbor Corps
or the Port Police Corps [to Limeniko Soma], so Chrysochoidis is
proposing a name in Greek consistent with its new mission to guard
Greece's coast [aktofylaki]. The functions of the port police will
migrate to the Ministry of the Economy, Competitiveness, and the
Merchant Marine. The Commandant, Admiral Retzemperis, resigned
over this change. END NOTE)


-- Second, he has changed the leaderships in both the Hellenic
National Police (HNP) and the firefighting service. Chrysochoidis
stressed that while it was important to introduce organizational
changes in the firefighting service, it was as important to change
public perceptions that fires are fought by helicopters from the
air and not by firefighters on the ground.


-- Third, he is reorganizing entirely the
counterterrorist structures. He repeated that Greece's
counterterrorist system had collapsed under New Democracy. So he
has appointed a new chief for the HNP's counterterrorist unit
(HNP/CTU), Alkiviadis Tzoitis, who is "a good officer, very
operational, very smart." He worked on security for the Olympics
and has previous experience in EYP. In addition, Chrysochoidis has
changed all the department heads in HNP/CTU.


-- Fourth, to foster interagency cooperation
Chrysochoidis is creating a mechanism to enhance cooperative ties
between HNP/CTU, EYP, and State Security. He claimed that the
three agencies had ceased speaking to each other under the previous


ATHENS 00001643 003 OF 004




government, but he was determined to create cross-agency ties
through personnel appointments and this new formal consultative
mechanism.


-- Fifth, Chrysochoidis announced that he intends to
create a new agency along the lines of a "mini-FBI" devoted to
combating organized crime, including cybercrime and trafficking,
that will consist of 100 officers, including economists,
scientists, and computer specialists, and that will be part of the
Attica Security structure. Chrysochoidis said that the Greek side
will need U.S. training to bring this agency up to the necessary
level of competence. In fact, he stated, Greece is open to all
forms of cooperation with the United States in security matters and
needs U.S. assistance to help it do so.






6. (C) The Ambassador replied that the United States would so all
that it could to help Greece. He noted as an example that the U.
S. side was ready to put a special agent and an analyst from DEA in
a potential new Greek task force on organized crime. He then asked
for Chrysochoidis' prediction on the nature of the annual
demonstrations -- and their anti-American orientation -- marking
the events of November 17, 1974. Chrysochoidis thanked the
Ambassador for his readiness to help his reorganization efforts and
said that he would be approaching appropriate elements in the
months ahead with specific requests for help. Turning to the
annual November 17 demonstration, he predicted that it would be
relatively quiet this year. Instead, anarchists and terrorists
instead are gearing up for violence in December to mark the
anniversary of the nation-wide riots in 2008 that occurred after
the accidental shooting on December 6 of a 15-year-old by a
policeman. According to information that the police have
collected, Greek anarchists are inviting their "brothers" in other
European countries, chiefly Spain, Italy, France, and Germany, to
come to Greece and engage in violent acts. For this reason,
Chrysochoidis declared, the MCP is formulating a plan that will
ensure a safe environment in December.






7. (C) The ambassador thanked Chrysochoidis for the resources that
the MCP devotes to keeping the embassy safe and repeated American
readiness to help the MCP with its reorganization. He suggested
that Chrysochoidis might find it useful to read a 2-page summary of
a longer study coordinated with the State Department about the
fires in Greece. The DCM added that the embassy could provide a
copy on a CD of the U.S. National Response Plan that had been
revised following Hurricane Katrina, since parts of it might be
useful to Chrysochoidis in considering structural changes within
the MCP.






8. (C) Following on the Ambassador's meeting, the DCM met with MCP
Deputy Minister Spyros Vougias on November 13. Vougias stated that
his portfolio will deal mainly with migration issues, and road
safety. Vougias admitted that Greece "could be better" on
anti-trafficking, and foreshadowed plans to create a division
within the MFA to coordinate Greek efforts across their
interagency, which the DCM welcomed. The DCM laid out for Vougias
how the Embassy is set up to work on law enforcement and terrorism
issues with Greece, and urged Vougias to ensure that Greek officers
who received U.S. training were placed in assignments where their
training could be put to use. On immigration issues, Vougias
commented that the MOJ and MOI needed to address the asylum issue,
as Greece's 0.1% granting rate was "too low;" he lumped immigration
with the economy and unemployment as among Greece's biggest
challenges. He was not overly concerned about November 17
demonstrations, but stressed that the government would not let a
repeat of last December's riots happen again this December. The
DCM highlighted the January visit of a DS/ATA Anti-Terrorism
Assistance assessment team to Greece, noting our hopes for close
cooperation with the government; Vougias agreed the visit would be


ATHENS 00001643 004 OF 004




productive, and looked forward to it. He stressed his intent to
improve professional education for the rank-and-file police, and
was frank in describing the double standard under which Greek
police operate: "society wants police everywhere, but then
criticizes the police when they act." In closing, the DCM assured
Vougias that VWP preparations were complete, and the last question
was how Greece and the U.S. could agree to roll out this positive
news.
Speckhard


ΠΡΕΖΑ TV
2-9-2011

ΜΠΑΜΠΙΝΙΩΤΗΣ ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΝΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΗ ΠΡΕΣΒΕΙΑ

Greek Education Reform Expert Wants U.S. Help

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000407





FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PPD AND ECA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/03/31
TAGS: PGOV, OPRC, OEXC, SCUL, GR
SUBJECT: Greek Education Reform Expert Wants U.S. Help


REF: ATHENS 260


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador, State, Executive;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a March 26 meeting with PAO and CAO, Greek
education reform expert Babiniotis shared GoG plans and timelines,
and enthusiastically welcomed U.S. assistance on implementing a
national university entrance exam system based on the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT). End summary.


2. (C) Prominent linguist, scholar, former rector of Athens
University (2000-2006) and GoG expert responsible for reforming the
Greek university entrance exam system, Professor George Babiniotis,
met with PAO and CAO on March 26. Babiniotis was candid about the
failings of the educational system in Greece, and the challenges to
implementing reforms.


3. (C) The current university admittance system is untenable,
Babiniotis said. Most parents and students view a university
degree as the ticket to advancement, which is the reason that more
than 100,000 students apply each year for the 40,000 university
slots. To be competitive, high school students concentrate on
private institution (frontistiria)-provided university preparatory
classes rather than their regular school classes. As a result
secondary students memorize material to pass the examinations
rather than really mastering subject matter. "We are graduating
aspiring university students rather than well-educated kids," he
lamented.




U.S. Assistance on University Testing Needed


4. (C) Babiniotis wants to change the current university entrance
system to one similar to that in the U.S., based on a combination
of high school grades and performance on a standardized exam
similar to the SAT, which students can take whenever they feel
ready to do so, thereby minimizing the pressure on students and the
reliance on frontistiria. At present the future of each student
depends on the performance on the day of the entrance examination.
Greece needs to develop a data bank of questions and computer based
testing allowing students the freedom to take the examinations at a
date of their convenience and to take the examination more than
once. (Tests derived from data banks select by random a limited
number of questions for a particular examination out of the tens of
thousands of possible questions.) With a large data bank of
questions, each examination would be unique for each test taker,
making it almost impossible to cheat or memorize test questions in
advance. Babiniotis enthusiastically accepted PAO's offer to
provide U.S. expertise on computerized testing as the GoG moves
down this path.




Prospects for Reform are Good


5. (C) According to Babiniotis, political prospects for
educational reform are improving. New Democracy and the opposition
PASOK parties are working together on a solution; Babiniotis has
seen PASOK's proposals (reftel) and thinks they are "logical," but
added that it is easier to push such reforms when in the
opposition. Babiniotis agreed that the elections for leadership
of the university teachers union (POSDEP), which ousted the
radicals supported by SYRIZA, was an indication that the university
community was eager for a change. Up to now the union had
supported all calls for strikes and disruptions of instruction at
the university. There is even support to reduce the percentage
from 40% of student representation in university decisions. There
is mounting pressure on both major parties from the public for
substantive reform, and soon.


6. (C) Primary school reform will be easiest, Babiniotis
predicted, while high school and university reform will be bigger
challenges due to political posturing and the politicization of
students. There needs to be a change in the mindset of the public,
which views university education as the only vehicle to
advancement. At the university level, Greece needs to scale back
on the number of institutions of higher learning - currently 23
universities and 15 technical schools (TEI) country-wide, according
to Babiniotis, while the remaining TEIs need to be strengthened to
meet the needs of the marketplace. A number of TEI need to be
incorporated into the departments of universities, Babiniotis said;
those universities, in turn, need more autonomy on decisions
related to budget, curriculum, enrollment and faculty.




University Problems: Politicization of Students and Abuse of
Asylum


7. (C) University students have become too politicized,
Babiniotis lamented, a holdover from the days of the military
dictatorship in Greece. This excessive politicization has caused
serious disruptions in university operations. Asylum is being
abused to the point where well-meaning students - the majority -
suffer in their pursuit of a higher education. While some students
turn to private education, their degrees are still not recognized
by the Greek state and, Babiniotis believes, will not be unless
there is broad political agreement to amend the Greek Constitution
to formally allow private education. While opposition PASOK leader
George Papandreou originally supported amending the constitution,
according to Babiniotis, he later backtracked and the issue of
private education remains unresolved.


8. (C) Comment: Babiniotis is a knowledgeable, respected
academic who knows the Greek educational system well and appears to
have support from both New Democracy and PASOK. Our meeting with
him, and his enthusiastic acceptance of our offer of U.S. help on
university entrance testing, has opened the door to U.S. input and
expertise on one of the most important reforms in recent Greek
history. In the coming months, Post will consult with the
Department on best ways to provide U.S. advice and assistance.




SPECKHARD

http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?ref=09ATHENS407


ΠΡΕΖΑ TV

ΠΡΟΤΑΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΑΝΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ ΠΛΗΡΟΦΟΡΙΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ - ΜΥΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΩΝ(WIKILEAKS GREEK CABLEGATE)

GREECE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION-SHARING AND DATA PRIVACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000117


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PTER, KTFN, KCRM, KHLS, ECPS, ECON, PREL, KPAO, KTIA, EUN, GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM
INFORMATION-SHARING AND DATA PRIVACY ISSUES WITH EUROPE

REF: STATE 8403; BERLIN 128

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah McCarthy, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; REASON:
1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Summary: Greeks are concerned about the privacy of data
involved in law enforcement and counterterrorism information
sharing with the U.S., as would be expected in a country with
privacy laws that are significantly stronger than the European
norm. Nevertheless, it is possible to engage in low-visibility and
necessary cooperation with Greece, as evidenced by the Greek
government's signing of HSPD-6 and PCSC agreements in 2009, which
we required for Greece to be eligible for the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP). Parliament ratified these agreements with support from both
major parties - the then-governing center-right New Democracy party
and the now-governing center-left PASOK party - despite criticism
from smaller parties. In general, mainstream Greek parties are not
doctrinaire on these issues, though they try to be careful to
minimize domestic political risk, and they do sometimes
opportunistically align themselves with larger countries within the
EU that take hard-line positions on certain data privacy issues.
We do not believe, however, that most Greek governments or Greek
MEPs would be willing to be the decisive holdout in blocking
U.S.-EU information sharing. Following up on ref A demarche, we
will continue to work with key Greek policy makers to ensure that
they understand the benefits of law enforcement and
counterterrorism information sharing and the flaws in some of the
most common arguments against it. End Summary.



2. (SBU) We shared ref A nonpaper February 5 with the Greek
government's point of contact for counterterrorism, MFA D1
(International Organizations) Directorate Counselor Dimitris
Papandreou, who disseminated it to relevant colleagues within the
government. We shared and discussed the paper February 17 with
Ministry of Justice advisor on EU issues Iota Karatzaferi. We also
reached out to selected Greek MEPs February 8 to express our
position on the February 11 European Parliament vote on the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). The response from these
contacts was positive, as is generally the case when we engage
Greek officials on these subjects.



3. (C) Nevertheless, suspicion of information sharing programs such
as these is an ingrained part of contemporary Greek political
culture, as a result of the high priority Greek governments have
put on privacy rights following the 1967-1974 junta period. This
has left Greece with some of the most restrictive privacy laws in
Europe, including a prohibition on the video recording of any
individuals in a public space for any reason other than traffic
control. These laws - though weakened in some areas by the
previous government in a package of legislative amendments passed
in June 2009 - continue to cause real problems for Greek law
enforcement. But despite the legal and political biases in favor
of an extreme view of privacy rights, Greek officials generally
take a much more nuanced view when it comes to concrete areas of
international cooperation. They tend to be open to reasonable
arguments, and at a fundamental level they are unwilling to take
any position that would put them on their own - either isolating
their party on the unpopular side of high-profile political debate
within Greece or isolating Greece in an internal EU debate.



4. (SBU) The Embassy will continue to engage key Greek officials
and opinion leaders, including MEPs with their new importance under
the Lisbon Treaty in ratifying agreements, to stress the successful
track record and the data privacy safeguards of existing
information sharing mechanisms. We noted that a U.S. team of data
privacy experts recently visited Brussels and perhaps other
European capitals to engage on these issues (ref B), and we believe
such a visit to Greece could serve a useful educational purpose for
elites in the major parties and opinion circles. Many Greeks are
instinctively suspicious of information-sharing programs, and this
is likely to remain a political fact of life for a long time, but
it does not have to be an obstacle to important U.S.-EU programs as
long as we take the time to educate key Greek decision makers well
in advance of crucial deadlines.



5. (U) Embassy Athens POC is Alan Purcell, PurcellAS@state.gov.
MCCARTHY

http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?ref=10ATHENS117

N4

SCENESETTER FOR ADM ROUGHEAD'S VISIT TO GREECE CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard,
S E C R E T ATHENS 001589



SIPDIS
NOFORN
FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO ADM ROUGHEAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/30
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PREL, PGOV, NATO, GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADM ROUGHEAD'S VISIT TO GREECE


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador;
REASON: 1.4(B), (C), (D)


1. (C) Admiral Roughead: Welcome to Greece. You are the first and
most senior flag officer to visit Greece since the October 4
national elections. Admiral Stavridis (as SACEUR) and Admiral
Fitzgerald (as NAVEUR) visited Athens in late September. Your
visit comes as newly elected PM George Papandreou, with Ministers
and a Parliament now in place, begins to focus on the task of
governing. Greece's dire economic situation will force Papandreou
to make some tough decisions on the Greek military budget, and
creates a tough domestic political environment for him when his
post-electoral public opinion "honeymoon" is over. U.S.-Greek
military-to-military cooperation is good, particularly at the U.S.
Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay on Crete, which plays a key
role in supporting U.S. military operations in the eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
Greece is also among the largest purchasers of U.S. military
equipment. At the same time, Greece's participation in NATO is
politically sensitive with weak public support for NATO operations.
Beyond politics, Greeks have a deep respect and affection for
Americans in general dating to the Marshall Plan and earlier,
though a significant percentage of the younger generation holds
sharply negative views of U.S. policies.






2. (C) Your visit will continue the uptick in our bilateral
relations over the course of 2009, and can help advance some of our
policy goals both in Greece and the region. We are encouraging the
Greeks to:
-- live up to the commitment the previous government made to
President Obama to enhance their Afghanistan contributions;


-- continue their efforts and look for ways to expand cooperation
on counter-piracy, such as signing the New York Declaration;


-- continue to support Turkey's EU orientation;


-- seek to foster goodwill in the Aegean and reciprocate any
Turkish gestures, despite passionately held views and frustrations;
and


-- work vigorously to find a solution to the Macedonia name issue
that would allow Macedonia to join NATO and the EU and strengthen
stability in Greece's neighborhood.


---------------------


Political Overview


---------------------




3. (C) The twelve months leading up to the October 4 Parliamentary
elections were marked by a succession of crises for the government
of Prime Minister Karamanlis, who had managed to hold onto his
one-seat majority in Parliament through a series of intra-party
scandals, the global financial crisis, widespread rioting following
the police shooting of a teenager, resurgent domestic terrorism,
huge numbers of illegal migrants entering Greece, an increase in
Turkish military overflights of Greek islands, and most recently
the serious forest fires on the outskirts of Athens in August. On
September 2, a somber Karamanlis, in the face of constant attack by
the opposition and plummeting approval ratings, called for new
elections, which his New Democracy party lost by a decisive
10-point margin.


4. (C) New PM (and Foreign Minister) Papandreou has an American
mother, has lived and studied in the U.S., and having been Foreign
Minister under a previous PASOK administration, developed a good
reputation in the international community as a thoughtful and
constructive interlocutor. While he must use careful rhetoric
domestically to avoid the "Amerikanaki" (little American) label by
detractors, our recent engagements with him have been positive.
-----


ISAF


-----


5. (C) At every opportunity, and at every level, we encourage the
Greeks to contribute more to efforts in Afghanistan. The caveat
limiting Greek soldiers to Kabul was lifted in April 2009. Greece
has pledged to stand up a 17-person OMLT in Jan/Feb 2010 (though
that timeline appears to be slipping) and to take control of the
Kabul airport in April 2010. These new missions should result in
the near doubling of the Greek contingent from its present size of
approximately 150 personnel to nearly 300. However, the Greeks
are seeking to upgrade their force protection assets first, which
threatens the deployment timeline and potentially the deployment.
They seek 32 MRAP-type vehicles and 52 anti-IED ECM devices, and a
host of other equipment including armored dump trucks and
bulldozers. Our ODC recently forwarded to DOD planners the
detailed list of equipment the Greek military has told us they
needed to fulfill this deployment commitment, and which they seek
to procure from the U.S. at reduced cost. In parallel, we have
learned that the Greeks are making the same equipment requests of
the British, Australians and Israelis.






6. (C) Additionally, given the non-deployable nature of much
Greek military hardware, and the focus of much of it across the
Evro River and Aegean toward Turkey, we believe that a strong pitch
to the Greeks to provide materiel and financial assistance to
NATO's Training Mission in Afghanistan could bear fruit. Greek
participation in ISAF remains unpopular with the Greek population
at large, and any future casualties that can be attributed to
inadequate force protection measures could result in extreme
pressure on the Government to remove its forces from ISAF.




------------------


Counter-Piracy


------------------




7. (C) We share many common views with the Greeks on piracy, and
it is an issue where we can maintain a robust and fruitful
dialogue. Greece is a staunch supporter of our position that
opposes the creation of an international tribunal to try suspected
pirates. Greece views positively the recent creation of an
International Trust Fund under the auspices of the UN to help
defray costs of piracy trials in developing countries, and is
considering a donation. The MFA has urged Greek ship owners to
send captains and crew to testify in piracy trials in other
countries. Greece served as the flagship command of the EU's first
ever naval operation, Atalanta, off of Somalia last year, has a
frigate now in Atalanta's current rotation, and participates at
present in NATO's Ocean Shield through its rotational contribution
to NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Group 2.






8. (C) On the negative side, Greece declined to sign the New York
Declaration on the margins of the last plenary meeting of the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in September.
They cite concerns that the document added little value to existing
IMO guidelines, was not a negotiated, consensus-based text among
CGPCS participants, implied that merchant vessels should be armed,
and was provided to them too late to be staffed through their
interagency. They also disagree with us on the need to prosecute
piracy suspects in Greek courts. While Greece has the ability to
try suspects in Greek courts, the government has in practice taken
the stance that the flag nation of the vessel, not the nation from
which the ship owners come, should have primary responsibility for
prosecuting any piracy attacks against a vessel. Assistant


Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs Shapiro during
his October 22-23 visit pressed the Greeks usefully on all these
fronts and was met with an open attitude by his interlocutors; your
visit presents a great opportunity to follow up with military
counterparts.






--------------------------------------------- -----


Turkey: EU Accession and Aegean Issues


--------------------------------------------- -----






9. (C) The Papandreou government continues its predecessor's
support for the accession of Turkey to the EU, but has told us that
they will not give a "blank check" to Turkey unless they see
satisfactory progress on key bilateral issues and Cyprus. Although
PM Papandreou is proud of his record of cooperation with Turkey
during his tenure as Foreign Minister (1999-2004), in campaign
interviews he warned that Turkey's EU aspirations could be "up in
the air" during its December 2009 EU evaluation should it continue
its present course of actions, particularly the provocative
overflights of Greek islands in the Aegean. Papandreou made a
well-received and much publicized snap trip to Istanbul on October
9, in the first days following his election, where he met with
Turkish PM Erdogan.






10. (C) Greece and Turkey still differ on a host of Aegean
issues, including air/seaspace demarcation, economic zones,
demilitarization issues, and flight safety requirements. Greece
often complains of Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, both
inside the Greeks' claimed 10 nautical mile airspace boundary
(which the U.S. does not recognize, because of the disparity with
their six nautical mile territorial sea claim), as well as within
the internationally recognized six nautical mile limits. To the
chagrin of Turkey, Greece "tags" as hostile unannounced Turkish
military flights in the Aegean, and Greek F-16s routinely intercept
Turkish aircraft. Armed, low-level Turkish overflights of the
inhabited Greek islands of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi dramatically
increased in 2009 compared to prior years, though the Turks
suspended these flights prior to the October 4 Greek elections, and
the suspension appears to have remained in effect. Both countries
have in the past attempted to use NATO exercises to press claims or
to make points. Should the Greeks raise this issue in your
meetings, we recommend taking an overall strategic approach that
emphasizes mutual respect, confidence building measures, and safety
of flight with both countries, while encouraging the Greeks to
respond positively to the cessation of Turkish overflights over the
inhabited islands. Suggesting that they should stop labeling
Turkish flights as hostile would be a good step, consistent with
what NATO has been encouraging in the past.


--------------


Other Issues


--------------


11. (C) OTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS: Greek contributions to
other important initiatives are substantial and should not be
overlooked. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Naval
Support Activity Souda Bay in Crete as a support hub for sea and
air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
(Comment: Although it is fine to thank them privately during
meetings, Greek public sentiment is generally anti-NATO, and
anti-American military, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay
and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they
would like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments.)
Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights of U.S. military aircraft a
year; participates in NATO's Operations Active Endeavour and Ocean
Shield, and in KFOR; the EU's counter-piracy mission off of Somalia
Operation Atalanta; and the UN's Lebanon mission, UNIFIL.




12. (C) U.S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: Greece is a large purchaser of
U.S. defense goods. We have over $8 billion in FMS cases and there
is potential for more than $6 billion coming up for international
competition over the next two years, though Greek budget
difficulties may hamper that. At present, the Hellenic Navy has
identified two procurement efforts: the upgrade of 4 MEKO class
frigates, and the new construction of up to six air defense
frigates.




13. (C) IMMIGRATION: Greece has become an entry point of choice
for illegal immigrants into the European Union. The number of
illegal migrants detained by Greek authorities has increased
dramatically over the last two years, reaching 140,000 last year
(in a country with a population of only about 11 million). The
presence of these migrants - many of whom originated in conflict
zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East and entered
Greece via Turkey - has become a major political issue. It also
roils Greek-Turkish relations on occasion, with the Greeks leveling
accusations that Turkey does not do enough to stop the outflow to
Greece, and indeed, aids and abets the illegal immigrants. Greece
is making a strong push for the European Union to take this issue
on and to negotiate repatriation agreements with source countries
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.






14. (S) TERRORISM: Greece has also been burdened with a
resurgence of domestic terrorism. Following several years of a
lull with the wrap-up of the November 17 group, attacks are again
on the rise. On October 27, Greek terrorists opened fire on a
police station and fled the scene, wounding six officers, two
seriously. An ammonium nitrate car bomb was detonated at the
Athens Stock Exchange on September 2 this year, causing significant
material damage, and a police officer was murdered in June. The
U.S. Embassy suffered an RPG attack in January of 2007. The U.S.
has been offering technical assistance and sharing intelligence
through DHS, FBI, and other agencies, but the Greeks are woefully
unprepared for any significant increase in terrorist activity. We
are also concerned that the rise of Greece as a migration path from
troubled spots to Western Europe and vice-versa opens the door to
international extremists making a foothold here or using Greece as
a "safe house" for planning nefarious activities.


15. (S//NF) VADM KARAMALIKIS. Your counterpart, VADM Karamalikis,
is approaching the end of his normal tour of duty, due to expire
next February. Recent developments, however, may drive him to
submit his resignation immediately following your visit. Despite
this, your engagement with the Hellenic Navy is still valuable to
US interests. Potential successors include the current Deputy
Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, VADM
Elefsiniotis; current Chief of the Hellenic Fleet, VADM Karaiskos;
and current Deputy Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, RADM
Vazeos; RADM Vazeos, however, is deemed by USDAO Athens to be an
unlikely candidate due to his junior rank.


16. (C) TYPE 214 SUBMARINE. The Hellenic Navy contracted for
four Type 214 submarines from German owned ThyssenKrupp. Four
hulls were built; one in Germany, and the other three in a Greek
Skaramanga Shipyard, partially operated by ThyssenKrupp.
Disagreements over perceived design flaws delayed delivery of all
four subs. As of today, production and fiscal difficulties on both
sides have resulted in the Germans pulling out of the deal. The
government of Greece is negotiating with the ThyssenKrupp regarding
the disposition of the four submarines, but it is likely the
Hellenic Navy will see none of the hulls commissioned into service.
This has direct impact on Hellenic Navy undersea warfare
capability.


17. (C) SKARAMANGA SHIPYARD. Skaramanga shipyard (formally
Hellenic Shipyard), the shipyard responsible for constructing three
of the four Type 214 submarines, is in danger of closing. The
closure would result in the loss of some 1300 jobs, the largest
shipyard in Greece and indigenous submarine construction
capability. Potential buyers from Sweden, Russia, China and Greece
exist, but the way forward depends on the resolution of the Type
214 contract.






18. (U) We are very much looking forward to your visit and
hosting you here in Athens.
Speckhard

http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?ref=09ATHENS1589

Ambassador Advocates for U.S. Interests and Mosque with Minister of Education Diamantopoulou (WIKILEAKS GREEK CABLEGATE)

Η ιδιωτικοποιήση των πανεπιστημίων μπορεί να διαλύσει το ΠΑΣΟΚ είπε η υπουργός. Συνάντηση του προέδρου του Deree College στο υπουργείο ζήτησε ο Αμερικανός πρέσβης.
ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΝΕΤΕ ΤΩΡΑ ΓΙΑΤΙ Η ΔΙΑΜΑΝΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ ΕΚΑΝΕ ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΓΙΑ ΝΑ ΙΔΙΩΤΙΚΟΠΠΟΙΗΣΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΑΠΑΞΙΩΣΕΙ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟ ΚΟΜΜΑΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΜΕΙΝΕ;;;


Ambassador Advocates for U.S. Interests and Mosque with Minister of Education Diamantopoulou


C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001723


SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/22
TAGS: SCUL, PGOV, PHUM, GR
SUBJECT: Ambassador Advocates for U.S. Interests and Mosque with
Minister of Education Diamantopoulou


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel Speckhard, Ambassador, State, Exec; REASON:
1.4(B), (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a December 17 call on Minister of Education
and Religious Affairs Anna Diamantopoulou , Ambassador Speckhard
lobbied for American educational institutions operating in Greece,
specifically with regard to licensing , recognition of degrees and
the granting and vocational rights for graduates. The Ambassador
also strongly urged the GOG to live up to its commitment to
establish at least one mosque in Athens. Diamantopoulou
reiterated the position that the Greek Constitution stipulates
that only Greek state institutions could be licensed as
universities. However, the GOG is willing to grant professional
rights (such as being hired by the public sector) to graduates of
qualified institutions provided that they became affiliated with EU
institutions of higher education. Diamantopoulou said that plans
were in the works for several mosques in Athens, not just one, to
accommodate Muslims of different sects. The Ambassador and
Diamantopoulou also discussed higher educational reform and the
role that the U.S. could play in facilitating these efforts, as
well as meetings we could arrange during her planned visit to the
U.S. in April 2010. End Summary.


2. (C) Although her portfolio also covers religious affairs,
Diamantopoulou stated that she spent 95% of her time on educational
matters. She criticized past educational reform efforts as being
too short term and too focused to make a real difference, meaning
that long term reforms never saw fruition. Each government wanted
to see immediate results such as changing the way students are
accepted to universities without taking into account that primary
and secondary education would have to be reformed as part of this
process. Real reform would involve changing the institutional
framework, changing the teacher mentality, and decentralizing the
educational system. On the latter point, Diamantopoulou noted that
even routine changes in a small provincial schools required
central Ministry approval.


3. (C) On the issue of granting licenses to U.S.-affiliated
schools operating in Greece, Ambassador Speckhard pushed strongly
for licensing of Anatolia College, which has been in Greece since
1923, and Deree College, operating since 1875 - and for the GOG
to recognize their degrees. In addition to providing sough-after,
high-quality American education in Greece, these schools also
provide hundreds of jobs to Greeks (only 7% of the staff in Deree
College is non-Greek and 10% in Anatolia), the Ambassador noted.
Diamantopoulou stated that the Greek Constitution explicitly
forbids the operation of private universities in Greece , stating
specifically that universities in Greece must be free and run by
the state. She added that a change to the constitution would
exact a cost not only in time (at least five years) but politically
as well, since initiating such a controversial move would engender
such social unrest that it could potentially split the ruling PASOK
party in two. As an example of how controversial the issue of
private higher education is, Diamantopoulou noted that the
appointment of Thalia Dragona as Special Secretary in the Ministry
has caused quite a stir because she graduated from Deree College,
and therefore does not have a recognized Greek degree. According
to Diamantopoulou, sentiments within the Greek university system
lie so firmly against the establishment of private universities
that when a university professor quit to become Dean of New York
College in Athens, he was ostracized by the Greek university
community.


4. (C) Diamantopoulou stated that under the present constitution
it is impossible for Deree College or even affiliates of EU
universities to have their degrees recognized, meaning that
graduates from these institutions cannot apply for graduate studies
in Greek universities. There is a process for recognition of
degrees for students from universities in the U.S. For example,
provided that the students took classes in the U.S. and not in
Greece. There is more flexibility on the issue of professional
rights, she stated, since the GOG is under EU pressure and will
allow graduates of franchises of EU universities to be hired by the
public sector even if they studied only in Greece. The only way a
graduate of Deree College could be hired by the public sector would
be for Deree College to become affiliated with an EU university (as
Anatolia has done). In the coming weeks, an accreditation body
will be set up under the Ministry of Education, made up of
academics, to determine which foreign institutions will receive
operating licenses. The Ambassador stated that it was unfortunate
that a quality institution such as Deree College might be forced to
compromise its American identity to widen the hiring options for
its graduates.


5. (C) The Ambassador also argued for the granting of tax
concessions for American colleges operating in Greece as non-profit
organizations and for relaxation of visa restrictions to allow
American students to stay for the duration of their courses, which
often extend beyond the 90-day visa limit. Ambassador Speckhard
also described the advantages to Greece of allowing selected
American teachers to stay for up to three years to provide




effective English instruction, for example, and urged the GOG to
review visa cases for these teachers on a flexible basis.


6. (C) Finally, Ambassador Speckhard urged the GOG to live up to
its commitment to establish a mosque in Athens, a city of 5,000,000
with no legal house of worship for the Muslim community. The
Ambassador stated that doing so would be proof to the international
community of Greece's support for religious freedom. Land owned by
the Greek Navy had been identified as a site for a mosque, but the
process appeared to be stuck. Diamantopoulou stated that Greece
was planning to open several mosques to meet the needs of different
sects, rather than to have only one mosque serving the whole city
of Athens. This approach would also address the problem of the
current 700 illegal places of worship for Muslims that exist in
Athens. A large site had already been identified in Elefsina with
plans for a 600 square meter mosque. The Greek Archbishop himself
had also donated land to be used as a mosque.


7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's offer of assistance in the
educational sector, Diamantopoulou stated that the university
teachers' union, POSDEP, which has begun to soften its rhetoric and
demonstrate a more moderate and progressive approach, is working
with the Ministry on Educational reform. The union will initiate
the reforms and the Ministry will support them. The Ambassador
offered assistance in this area as well as in the area of
accreditation if needed. The Minister mentioned that she planned
on visiting the U.S. in late-March/early April to coincide with
Greek Independence Day and may seek assistance in setting up
meetings with counterparts in the education field. At the
Ambassador's request, Diamantopoulou promised to arrange meetings
for the President of Deree College with the Deputy Minister of
Education after the holidays.


8. (C) Comment: Although Diamantopoulou is an impressive and
expert interlocutor in the field of education, her government's
present policy represents a significant step backward from the
previous New Democracy government as far as U.S. institutions of
higher education - and their graduates -- are concerned. A few
days before leaving office, the New Democracy government gave
licenses to 33 foreign colleges to function as institutions of
higher education. The New Democracy Ministry had also outlined a
process for recognition of degrees from U.S. colleges as long as
they were accredited in the U.S. The present government has
adopted a narrow legalistic barrier using the Greek constitution as
the reason for avoiding contentious issues of recognition of
foreign institutions of higher education in Greece, despite the
fact that these institutions have educated tens of thousands of
Greek professionals. The good news is that elite institutions such
as Deree College and Anatolia College will be treated the same as
other foreign colleges operating in Greece. The bad news is that
all will be barred from having their degrees recognized by Greece.
Our conversation with the Minister underlined once again how
difficult it is in Greece to institute meaningful reform. A
university system which remains closed to foreign innovations and
hostage to syndicate interests will fall further behind those in
other countries more open to global innovations. Rather than
adopting a forward leaning posture encouraging the Ministry to
incorporate American institutions of higher education into the
Greek system, we may need to guard against further incursions into
the autonomy of quality American institutions of higher education
in Greece.
Speckhard

http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?ref=09ATHENS1723


ΠΡΕΖΑ TV

Νίκη Τζαβέλα, σε συνάντησή της με Αμερικανούς διπλωμάτες(wikileaks Greek cablegate)

....αποκάλυψε η βουλευτής του ΛΑΟΣ, Νίκη Τζαβέλα, σε συνάντησή της με Αμερικανούς διπλωμάτες. Μελλοντική συνεργασία με τη ΝΔ ύστερα από εκλογική αποτυχία σκεπτόταν ο πρόεδρος του ΛΑΟΣ.


Greece's Surging Far-Right LAOS Party Inches Towards Center


C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001515


SIPDIS


C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH CLASSIFICATION CHANGE
- AND CLASSIFIED BY LINE)


DEPT PASS TO EUR/SE, EUR/OHI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/28
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SMIG, KIRF, GR
SUBJECT: Greece's Surging Far-Right LAOS Party Inches Towards Center


REF: A) ATHENS 1315; B) ATHENS 1459; C) ATHENS 1255; D) ATHENS 1033


CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B), (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the aftermath of their unprecedented success
in European Parliament elections in June, the leaders of Greece's
surging, far-right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) expect to win 6 to
7 percent of the vote and up to 20 parliamentary seats in October 4
domestic elections and are preparing to be a "more responsible
party" on human rights and foreign affairs issues. Niki Tzavella,
LAOS' senior Member of European Parliament (MEP) and a party
strategist, described to Poloff on September 23 how party chief
Georgios Karatzaferis understood that LAOS' rising political
fortunes meant that the party had to move away from its previously
ultra-nationalistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric. According to
Tzavella, Karatzaferis wanted to make positive gestures to Greece's
Jewish community, was seeking increased contact with American
officials, had tempered his tough anti-immigration stance by
meeting with migrants and committing to anti-racism declarations,
and wished to burnish his foreign relations credentials by
orchestrating an "accidental" but substantive meeting with Turkish
PM Erdogan on the margins of a future EU meeting. Tzavella said
that she and Karatzaferis, both ex-New Democracy (ND)
parliamentarians, shared the same ultimate goal of joining LAOS and
the ND in a broad center-right coalition--and would continue
pressuring ND parliamentarians to defect to their party. END
SUMMARY.






2. (U) See ref A for a broader overview of October 4 parliamentary
elections.






----------------------------------------


LAOS Well-Placed for a Strong Electoral Showing


----------------------------------------






3. (C) In June European Parliament elections, LAOS rode a wave of
discontent among center-right voters over ND's handling of the
December 2008 riots in Athens, illegal immigration, and the
economic crisis to win an unprecedented 7.15 percent of the vote,
sending two LAOS MEPs--including Niki Tzavella--to Brussels (see
ref D). Since then, Karatzaferis has pursued a two-pronged
strategy of poaching disgruntled ND politicians and publicly
declaring his desire for a LAOS-ND grand coalition. LAOS scored a
political coup on September 9 by convincing the ex-chief of the
Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP), Ioannis Korandis, to
lead the LAOS state parliamentary slate. Korandis brings
experience managing a government agency, a previous stint as Greek
ambassador to Turkey, and also a reputation as a law-and-order
leader. With Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis cutting longtime
party members from his own slates, ND is in disarray and morale has
suffered--all good news for Karatzaferis, who has welcomed three
defecting MPs to his party list with open arms. Mid-September
polls estimate that LAOS will win 6 to 7 percent of the electorate,
nearly double its take of 3.8 percent during the last domestic
elections in 2007. With LAOS still reaping the benefits of its
clear stance against immigration and enjoying a strong nationalist
base in northern Greece, Tzavella noted, she and Karatzaferis
secretly hoped to win 8 percent of the vote and up to 20
parliamentary seats.






----------------------------------------


Turning a New Leaf on Anti-Semitism, National Issues?


----------------------------------------
4. (C) Tzavela stressed that LAOS leaders recognized that the
party's newfound political strength required it to be "more
responsible," especially given LAOS' reputation as anti-Semitic and
xenophobic.


Tzavela took pains to highlight several ongoing and future
initiatives to moderate the party's positions: 1) Immediately
after LAOS' strong Euro-elections showing, Karatzaferis instructed
party delegates to "tone down" irresponsible anti-Semitism and
racist remarks; 2) Karatzaferis met with illegal migrants in April
to highlight that his proposal for strict immigration quotas was
not racist; 3) LAOS MEPs had signed a public declaration against
racism, discrimination, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia
in Brussels; 4) Tzavela had reached out to the leader of the
Thessaloniki Jewish community, David Saltiel, to discuss how LAOS
can have better relations; 5) Konstantinos Plevris, who had
authored the anti-Semitic "The Jews--The Whole Truth" and who had
called Jews "subhuman" and "mortal enemies," had left LAOS; and 6)
soon after the October 4 elections, Karatzaferis would publish a
signed editorial in a "major newspaper" supporting the resolution
of property restitution negotiations over the Thessaloniki Jewish
cemetery. These actions, Tzavela said, demonstrate that LAOS can
be a responsible partner in a center-right coalition--and should
allay U.S. concerns about LAOS' anti-Semitism. (NOTE: Post has
refrained from inviting LAOS leaders to events such as the July 4
reception due to Karatzaferis' previous anti-Semitic statements and
his having denied that the Holocaust occurred. See the 2009 State
Department Human Rights Report for additional details.)






----------------------------------------


The Future: A LAOS-ND Center-Right Coalition?


----------------------------------------






5. (C) Despite LAOS' recent political success hewing to a
far-right, anti-immigration, law-and-order platform, top party
leaders appear to be seeking a way to reunite with ND, either in a
center-right coalition or possibly by melding LAOS and ND into one
entity. In a July 17 meeting, Tzavela said Karatzaferis, ever
since being expelled from ND in 2000, hoped to return to his old
party--and this desire was part of the reason he had embraced a
strategy of calling for a ND-LAOS coalition. During the September
23 meeting, Tzavela noted that she, too, hoped that LAOS could
rejoin ND to form a stable coalition focused on private enterprise,
market-based economic reforms, and revitalizing the 1970s "glory
days" of the Greek center-right. (NOTE: Tzavela herself is a
former ND parliamentarian.) However, given the distaste of most ND
interlocutors towards the notion of cooperating with LAOS (see refs
B and C), Tzavela recognized that ND would have to suffer a
wrenching defeat or otherwise undergo a major change of heart
before a coalition might be realistic.






6. (C) Tzavela assessed that ND would very likely lose the October
4 elections to PASOK and that Karamanlis would step down as party
chief. Tzavela thought his most likely successors were Minister of
Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyianni, Minister of Culture Antonis
Samaras, or Minister of Health and Social Solidarity Dimitris
Avramopoulos. Samaras and Avramapoulos would probably be more
amenable to LAOS-ND cooperation, Tzavela noted, so if either took
over ND, LAOS would push hard for a coalition; such a coalition
would likely push the liberal wing of ND into PASOK's arms. Should
the vehemently anti-LAOS Bakoyiannis take the helm (or should
Karmanlis stay on), however, Karatzaferis would likely continue a
strategy of building strength in hopes of forming a coalition later
down the line.
----------------------------------------
COMMENT: Moderation Both a Risk and an Opportunity
----------------------------------------


7. (C) If LAOS performs strongly in the October 4 elections,
gaining 7 or more percent of the vote, Karatzaferis and Tzavela
will face two strategic questions: Should LAOS moderate and become
a "responsible party," risking the loyalty of its vociferous
far-right, ultra-nationalist base? And, does LAOS stand a chance
of pursuing a center-right coalition, even while ND officials at
all levels of the party vehemently deny they will ever cooperate?
During June European Parliament elections, LAOS profited at ND's
expense due to the timely elevation of law-and-order issues and
migration to the forefront of the Greek political agenda. If PASOK
comes to power in October, however, ND has a chance to find new
leadership, reorganize itself in opposition, and refocus on
defending its ideological right flank. With ND potentially
returning to its roots on the political right, and LAOS inching
towards the center, LAOS faces both a big risk and a big
opportunity: This political convergence may deprive LAOS of its
political raison d'etre but also might bring Karatzaferis and
Tzavela's vision of a centre-right coalition or merger one step
closer to fruition. One thing is certain: ND officials may view
LAOS with distaste (see ref B), but they can no longer afford to
ignore Karatzaferis at the polls or when planning political
strategy--LAOS has become an important force to be reckoned with
on Greece's political right. END COMMENT.


----------------------------------------
Biographical Information: Niki Tzavela
----------------------------------------


8. (C) Tzavela openly admitted that she "did not fit the LAOS
mold" and reserved the right to chart a political future
independent from that of Karatzaferis. Tzavela complained that "no
one in the EU Parliament did any work" and said that she would work
hard to improve U.S.-EU legislative ties on energy security issues.
She hoped to invite the Russian energy minister to Brussels. Other
details:


-- Former ND parliamentarian, speaks fluent English


-- Worked in a Israeli Jewish kibbutz as a teenager; studied at
Howard University


-- LAOS' senior MEP in Brussels and Vice Chairwoman of the Europe
of Freedom and Democracy super-party; Vice Chairwoman of the U.S.
Delegation in the European Parliament and member of the Committee
on Industry, Research, and Energy


-- Was appointed Vice President of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games
Committee by PASOK Prime Minister Costas Simitis


-- Previous Vice President of the Kokkalis Foundation, which runs a
program on Southeast and East-Central Europe policy at the Harvard
Kennedy School


-- Previous Executive Director for International Development for
the Antenna TV Group
Speckhard


http://www.thepressproject.gr/searchlabdetails.php?ref=09ATHENS1515